I have generally been a little hesitant to post things here that
deal directly with historical Jesus studies. After all, I am writing a
monograph on the matter, and I would like to use this space to post ruminations
on critical realism that go beyond the more specific focus of that book. Plus,
I don’t want to steal my own thunder. Still, there are sometimes things that
burn in your brain and won’t release you until you share them with the world.
What follows is an example of such a thing.
I have come to realize that the central issue in historical Jesus
studies is where we locate reality, and thus also what we mean by the word
"true." The criteria approach proceeds upon the supposition that the
real (or, to use the term preferred in such scholarship, "authentic")
is to be found in ancient statements about Jesus. That means it is in the
gospels, canonical and otherwise, select passages in Paul, select passages in
Josephus, etc. This supposition however does not entail that every ancient
statement about Jesus is a statement about the real. Thus it is concluded that
the task of the historian is to distinguish those statements which are about
the real from those which are not, i.e. to distinguish true statements from
untrue statements, and then to assemble a Jesus from whatever statements are
deemed to be true. Thus results what Collingwood called "scissors and
paste history," wherein our historical narratives about Jesus become mere
collages of pieces cut out from the gospels and potentially other material. I
like to think of this as the Frankenstein Jesus.
The last ten years or so have seen genuine advance in the study of
the historical Jesus precisely because the discourse has moved from a general
focus from the truth of statements found in the sources towards the interpretation
of said sources. This shift can be conveniently dated to Dunn’s Jesus
Remembered, and has been advanced by the work of younger scholars such as
Chris Keith, Anthony Le Donne, and Rafael Rodriguez. They have rightly grasped
that what we have in statements given in the sources are not the real but
rather interpretations, and that moreover what we produce as Jesus historians
are in fact further interpretations. For the historian the question “Is this
statement given in the sources?” is thus invariably a question mal posée. That the discourse as whole has moved from such questions is
genuine advance. It nonetheless leaves a number of epistemic questions
unresolved.
Where I think that we presently struggle is that we do not yet
have a clear idea how one can move from the interpretation of sources to
judgments about the real. If we locate the real within our interpretations then
how do we know what interpretation is true? How do we know whether my
interpretation is any truer than your interpretation? That is where we are at,
I think. There has been genuine advance, but like any genuine advance it has
created new difficulties that now require resolution. In response to these
difficulties there will inevitably be the reactionary who wants to return to the
more familiar world that existed before the advance (consider Foster’s argument
at “The Blow-up in Baltimore” that what Keith and Rodriguez are doing isn’t
really historical Jesus studies because it is not concerned with the truth of
statements given in the sources); there will also be the nihilist who will
declare that if the old ways of doing things will not yield truth then truth
cannot be found (consider Crook’s declaration in the same session of a “New No
Quest”); then there will be those who diligently, thoughtfully, carefully, work
through the difficulties (consider Keith and Rodriguez in that session, or Le
Donne and Jens Schröter in print). Neither the reactionary nor the nihilist
represents a way forward, for the former counsels taking a step back whilst the
latter denies the very possibility of further steps.
Returning to the question of the real, if it is not to be found in
statements given in the sources or our interpretations of the sources then
where is it to be found? Lonergan’s answer is that it is found in the “fit”
between the sources and the interpretation thereof. Put differently, the
interpretation is a hypothesis advanced to answer a question borne from
observation of the sources (which we will henceforth designate as “data”) and
insofar as it is warranted by the data a hypothesis articulates the real. Thus
Lonergan’s critical realism is the position that the real consists of warranted
judgments. For the historian the real is not a past “out there” because there
is no past out there. Today is not two millennia ago. However the past that did
exist two thousand years ago left traces of itself upon the presence that does
exist and through these the historian can say things about that past. And
insofar as those things which the historian says are warranted by those traces
they are the real.
The question of moving from "interpretation" to "reality judgments" is one I've wrestled with, but you've posed it in a much more refined and knowledgeable way than I've as of yet been able to explore – this has been extremely helpful. Thanks so much for your outlook.
ReplyDeleteThank you for your kind words, Damon, and I am pleased to hear that I could help. I mean, really, that's all I'm trying to do: share my own struggles on these matters, with the hope that perhaps others will find some nuggets of insight that can help them in their own.
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